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ABSTRACT 
The trend towards increasing electoral volatility has triggered a rich literature investigating 
which voters are most likely to switch parties in subsequent elections. Less is known, 
however, on the role parties play in causing voters to switch parties.  From a Downsian 
perspective we assume that changes in parties’ ideological positions should cause voters to 
switch parties from one election to another. The current paper addresses these shortcomings in 
the literature by bringing together literature on volatility and research on responsiveness to 
political party. For doing so, we make use of the data from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES) project. The results presented in this paper show that parties’ 
ideological shifts are indeed causing voters to switch parties. The extent to which this 
mechanism of accountability functions, however, is partly dependent on individual- as well as 
contextual-level factors.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Even though the founding fathers of electoral research were already intrigued by voters who 
switch parties and their characteristics (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1964; Converse, 1962), a number of questions on the 
mechanisms causing voters to switch parties remain. As a prime example, the debate on how 
political sophistication relates to electoral volatility is still on-going (Dassonneville & 
Dejaeghere, 2014; Kuhn, 2009; Lachat, 2007). In this paper, we shed new light on this 
question by taking into account shifts at the party level, an element that has been overlooked 
by previous research.  
 
The importance of investigating what the link between sophistication and volatility is, lies in 
the normative implication of whether it is the high or low politically sophisticated who are 
most likely to switch parties. In elections, the balance of power rests with those voters who 
switch parties. Ideally, therefore, these switches are based on well-considered decisions by 
knowledgeable and interested citizens (Granberg & Holmberg, 1990). 
 
Investigating this research puzzle, previous research has addressed the question of whether it 
is high or low sophisticated voters who switch parties most (Dassonneville, 2012, 2014; 
Kuhn, 2009; Lachat, 2004). Others have drawn attention to the ideological distance bridged 
by voters switching parties and the need to take into account whether voters switch to 
ideologically close or more distant parties (Dassonneville & Dejaeghere, 2014; van der Meer, 
Lubbe, van Elsas, Elff, & van der Brug, 2012). In this paper, we claim that all of these studies 
are overlooking a crucial element by not taking into account shifts at the party level when 
assessing the characteristics of floating voters. The assumption in research on the link 
between political sophistication and volatility is simply that high sophisticates make well-
considered decisions and low sophisticates don’t. Instead of making that inference, we more 
directly investigate the actual mechanism that makes voters switch parties from one election 
to another. For concluding whether or not party switchers are whimsical (van der Meer, Elsas, 
Lubbe, & Van der Brug, 2014), it does not suffice to look at how politically sophisticated 
voters are. What we should investigate is the extent to which voters are responding to parties’ 
behaviour – i.e. the extent to which voters change their vote as parties shift their position. 
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The theoretical foundations for bringing parties into research on the causes of electoral 
volatility are to be found in the responsible party model (Arnold & Franklin, 2012; Sartori, 
1968). There is strong empirical evidence pointing out that parties and their voters do have 
largely similar ideological opinions (Costello, Thomassen, & Rosema, 2012; Dalton, 1985). 
Furthermore, this correlation has been shown to be dynamic and so in two ways. Parties have 
been found to adjust their positions in response to the electorate and citizens were found to be 
responding to parties changing stances as well (Adams, Ezrow, & Leiter, 2012; Adams, 
Ezrow, & Somer-Topcu, 2014; Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009; Fortunato & Stevenson, 2013). 
The latter phenomenon is what we assume to be an important causal mechanism explaining 
why voters change parties from one election to another. 
 
We first discuss previous research on electoral volatility and why political sophistication is 
regularly looked at for understanding the causes and consequences of volatility. In a next 
section, we elaborate on why we expect ideological shifts at the party-level to be of 
importance in this debate. After formulating our hypotheses, we present the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems, which is the data source used for investigating this question. We 
subsequently present our results and we end with some conclusions of the implications of our 
findings and thoughts for further research. 
 
2. UNSOPHISTICATED SWITCHERS? 
 
The question whether party switching is an expression of high or low political sophistication 
and involvement has been a source for debate in the literature on voting behaviour ever since 
the 1950s. Berelson et al. (1954) investigated the characteristics of voters changing parties in 
the course of an electoral campaign and came to the conclusion that “Stability in vote is 
characteristic of those interested in politics and instability of those not particularly 
interested” (Berelson et al., 1954: 20). This observation, which has been coined as ‘the 
floating voter hypothesis’, has consequently sparked a normatively loaded debate on the link 
between political sophistication and volatility. These findings have been interpreted as being 
at odds with what an ideal type democracy should look like. If Berelson and his colleagues 
have it right, the implication is that alterations in election results and therefore in governance 
are driven by changes among the least interested part of the electorate (Granberg & 
Holmberg, 1990).  
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Further studies on the link between volatility have refined the original ‘floating voter 
hypothesis’ somewhat. It has been argued and empirically found to be valuable to think of a 
non-linear relation between political sophistication and volatility. Low sophisticated voters 
are unlikely to perceive a lot of political information and hence thought to rely on habitual 
cues, leading to stability in voting behaviour. High sophisticates on the other hand, do receive 
a lot of political information, but their well-developed political attitudes are assumed to make 
them resistant to changing their behaviour accordingly. As a consequence, it is the middle 
sophisticated who are thought and found to be most likely to switch parties – either during a 
campaign period or from one election to another (Converse, 1962; Kuhn, 2009; Lachat, 
2007). 
 
A second refinement can be found in the work of Russell Dalton (1984, 2012, 2013), who 
claims that electorates have changed fundamentally since the early voting studies were 
published. According to Dalton, a group of high cognitively mobilised apartisans has 
emerged. This group of voters is politically sophisticated and for that reason does not have to 
rely on partisanship to guide vote choices. Instead, these voters are free to choose 
independently and from one election to another what party to vote for. As a consequence, 
volatility in recent decades can be related to high levels of interest and involvement in 
politics, which would fit to the democratic ideal (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002). Dalton’s 
theoretical accounts, however, are contested in a number of studies pointing out that the 
empirical evidence points in opposite directions (Albright, 2009; Dassonneville, Hooghe, & 
Vanhoutte, 2012, 2014; Marthaler, 2008). 
 
Thirdly, some nuance has been added to the debate by scholars pointing out that even though 
levels of volatility can be substantial, most switching is still confined to particular ideological 
blocs (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; van der Meer et al., 2012; van der Meer et al., 2014). Taking 
into account the directionality of switching, these studies furthermore indicate that only 
switching between ideologically distant parties is clearly linked to low levels of political 
sophistication (Dassonneville & Dejaeghere, 2014; van der Meer et al., 2014).  
 
Regardless of the refinements made, all research investigating the link between political 
sophistication and volatility shares the same underlying assumption. It is thought that if 
volatility is associated to high levels of political sophistication or involvement in politics, this 
would foster what is generally referred to as a democratic ideal of voters judging “candidates 
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and parties on their policies and governmental performance” (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002: 
60) 
 
3. PARTY POSITION SHIFTS 
 
High sophisticated party switchers could indeed be argued to be a necessary condition for 
volatility to advance the democratic ideal. We argue, however, that merely looking at levels 
of political sophistication, interest or involvement is not sufficient for drawing strong 
conclusions in this debate. From a Downsian perspective on voting, voters need not be fully 
informed on parties’ positions or the issues at stake to make rational decisions (Downs, 1957). 
Instead, what we should investigate is therefore whether party switching results from voters’ 
assessment of how the government has performed or voters’ judgements of parties’ policies 
and ideological positions (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002). It is this latter consideration that is 
central in this paper.  
 
For the assumption that party switching is indeed driven by ideological shifts of parties to be a 
possibility, three conditions should be met. First, that voters do vote for parties that have 
ideological positions that closely match their own opinions. Second, that parties change their 
positions from one election to another. And third, that voters perceive change when parties 
shift their ideological positions or policies. The literature offers evidence validating each of 
these three conditions. 
 
First, in representative democracies, it is deemed essential that parties’ ideological positions 
are consistent with how their voters think about policy. According to the ‘responsible party 
model’ sufficient ideological congruence between citizens and parties ensures a link between 
the public opinion and policy (Adams et al., 2014; Costello et al., 2012; Dalton, 1985). Strong 
empirical evidence does substantiate the claim that voters have policy opinions that closely 
match the positions of the parties they vote for (Costello et al., 2012; Dalton, 1985).  
 
Second, parties have previously been found not to be inert actors, but to change ideological 
and policy positions over time. Different mechanisms are generally referred to as why parties 
do so. Somer-Topcu (2009) for example found parties winning elections to be less likely to 
subsequently change positions than parties losing elections are. Adams and his colleagues, by 
contrast, do not find indications of parties responding to previous election results by changing 
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their ideologies (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2004) Furthermore, parties have been 
found to react to competing parties, with Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) for example 
showing that parties tend to shift positions in the same direction as their rivalling parties have 
done before. Importantly, parties have been found to change positions as a reaction to changes 
in public opinion as well (Adams et al., 2004; Budge, 1994). As a refinement to this 
observation, while mainstream parties are generally responding to the mean voter, niche 
parties are sensitive to changes among their own supporters instead (Ezrow, De Vries, 
Steenbergen, & Edwards, 2010). 
 
Third, evidence accumulates showing that citizens do perceive change when parties shift 
policy positions (Adams et al., 2014; Fortunato & Stevenson, 2013). Even though voters do 
not seem to respond to changes in manifestos or to shifts communicated through campaign 
communication (Adams, Ezrow, & Somer-topcu, 2011), voters are responding to perceptions 
of change –as for example observed by experts as well (Adams et al., 2014). It has also been 
shown that voters react more strongly to changes as observed through actual policies than 
through (election) promises and that when parties are in a governmental coalition, this fact 
acts as a heuristic for voters to perceive how parties change ideologies (Fortunato & 
Stevenson, 2013).  
 
In sum, it seems as if all conditions are met for volatility to potentially be driven by voters 
responding to ideological shifts of parties. Tavits (2007) has indeed shown that –at an 
aggregate level– ideological shifts have an impact on the electoral results of parties, albeit 
only positively so if parties shift on pragmatic issues. It remains to be seen, however, whether 
at an individual-level as well, we can observe a link between ideological shifts of parties on 
the one hand and party switching by voters on the other.  
 
A Downsian framework of vote maximization makes us think of two related mechanisms that 
would link parties’ ideological shifts to shifts by voters. First, a voter can feel that a party she 
voted for no longer represents her interests because of the party’s changed policy positions. 
The voter can then decide to leave that party. Second, parties are thought to change positions 
because they hope to attract new voters (Downs, 1957; Williams, 2014). Consequently, as 
parties move positions and come closer to the ideological position of a voter of another party, 
this voter can decide to move towards this party. The overview of the literature makes clear 
 7 
that there are a number of reasons to assume that parties’ shifts are indeed a driving 
mechanism for volatility, which leads to our first hypotheses. 
 
H1a The more the previously voted party shifts ideologically away from a voter, the higher 
the probability that the voter switches away from this party. 
H1b The more another party shifts ideologically towards a voter, the higher the probability 
that a voter switches towards this party. 
 
While we expect these hypotheses to hold in general, we also think it is essential to take into 
account aspects of heterogeneity for gaining insights in how party shifts affect individual-
level volatility. As a first aspect, we have to take into account the likely conditioning effect of 
political sophistication on the link between party shifts and volatility. Perceiving parties’ 
ideological positions and shifts therein, can be assumed to require a certain level of political 
sophistication. Analogous to what has been found with regard to economic voting and 
performance voting (De Vries & Giger, 2014; Gomez & Wilson, 2001), we hypothesize that 
higher levels of political sophistication lead to more ideological responsiveness and to a 
higher probability to subsequently switch parties due to parties’ ideological shifts. As this 
should hold for both moving towards as well as moving away from a party, we formulate one 
general hypothesis. 
 
H2 The more politically sophisticated is a voter, the stronger the relation between parties’ 
ideological shifts and the voter’s probability to switch parties. 
 
In addition to individual-level heterogeneity conditioning the impact of parties’ shifts on 
volatility, we expect party-level characteristics to be influential factors as well. In 
parliamentary systems, it is the parties in governments that dominate the policy-making 
process by proposing and implementing policies (Laver & Shepsle, 1996). Opposition parties 
may have some influence on government policies as well, but that depends upon the majority 
or minority status of the government and whether the latter is formed by a coalition of parties 
or not (Powell, 2000: 51-55). In general, however, incumbent parties strongly control the 
legislative agenda in parliamentary system (Tsebelis, 2002). Given that voters’ perceptions of 
the ideological position of parties are strongly influenced by parties’ behaviour in office 
(Adams et al., 2014; Fortunato & Stevenson, 2013), the actions of incumbent parties should 
be more salient to voters than opposition parties’ behaviour. Consequently, our assumption is 
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that voters will more easily perceive a party shift when it is an incumbent party than when the 
party is in opposition. This assumption also relies on a conception of elections as an 
instrument for citizens to hold their government accountable for their actions (Powell, 2000; 
Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). When a government drifts away from its initial 
promises – e.g. when its changes ideological position – its supporters may well punish it by 
switching parties. Similarly, government parties can change positions, moving towards those 
who earlier did not vote for them. These voters can just as well reward the incumbent parties 
by switching towards the parties in office. 
 
H3a The relation between parties’ ideological shifts and volatility is stronger for incumbent 
parties than for opposition parties. 
 
Furthermore, there are reasons to think that the type of government that is in office is of 
relevance as well. Scholars have previously argued that the accountability mechanism is more 
difficult to achieve under coalition governments than under single-party majority 
governments (Fisher & Hobolt, 2010; Powell & Whitten, 1993; Powell, 2000). The reason is 
that in case of a coalition of parties only one policy is adopted for a given issue resulting from 
a compromise between parties (Martin & Vanberg, 2014) while each party is held accountable 
separately at election time. The fact that multiple parties are responsible for the overall 
government direction makes it difficult for voters to weigh the responsibility of each party 
separately. As a result, economic and retrospective voting are generally less important under 
coalition governments than is the case for single-party majority governments (Fisher & 
Hobolt, 2010; Powell & Whitten, 1993). For these reasons, ideological shifts by parties in 
coalition governments are blurred by the other signals sent from the government as a whole 
but also by the other coalition members. We thus expect the relation between parties’ 
ideological shifts and volatility to be stronger for parties in a single-party government than for 
incumbent parties in a coalition government. 
 
H3b The relation between parties’ ideological shifts and volatility is stronger for parties in a 
single-party government than for parties in a coalition government. 
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4. DATA AND METHODS 
In order to test the hypotheses, we use the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) covering the 2001-2011 period. One of the main advantages of the CSES 
dataset is that respondents were surveyed in several countries in a standardized way. It is the 
comparative feature of the data – with multiple countries and hence party systems covered – 
that renders the CSES the ideal dataset to investigate the effect of party-level factors on 
volatility. We limit the analyses to countries were a sufficient number of consecutive elections 
is covered by election surveys in order to allow measuring shifts in party positions (see 
below). As a result, the focus of the current paper is on voting behaviour in advanced 
industrial democracies. Overall, the analyses cover 22,679 respondents in 23 elections that 
took place in the following countries: Australia, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Great Britain. 
 
As parties do react to each other as well (Williams, 2014) it could be considered essential to 
take into account all dynamics in the party system and how voters react to these movements. 
To this end we have transformed the data into a stacked data matrix of respondent-party 
dyads. As such, we can model the reactions of voters to all ideological shifts in the party 
system. As a clarification for this stacking procedure, look at Figure 1 below. Voter x voted 
for party C in the current election and for party B in the previous election. In the transformed 
data-matrix, this is represented by twice not voting (0) for party A, voting for party B in the 
previous election (1) but not doing so in the current election (0) and not voting for party C in 
the previous election (0), but doing so in the current election (1). 
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Figure 1. Transformation to a stacked data-matrix of voter-party dyads in a context 
with three parties (A, B and C) 
 
Original data file 
 Previous vote Current vote 
Voter x B C 
Voter y A A 
Voter z A C 
 
Transformed data - Voter-Party dyads 
 Previous vote Current vote 
Voter x – Party A 0 0 
Voter x – Party B 1 0 
Voter x – Party C 0 1 
Voter y – Party A 1 1 
Voter y – Party B 0 0 
Voter y – Party C 0 0 
Voter z – Party A 1 0 
Voter z – Party B 0 0 
Voter z – Party C 0 1 
 
 
4.1  MEASURES AND EXPECTATIONS 
The dependent variable for testing the hypotheses is a categorical variable constructed based 
on the information in the stacked data matrix and has four outcome options. The value of the 
dependent variable is 0 if a voter stable voted for the same party (e.g. voter y and party A in 
Figure 1), its value is 1 if a voter stable not voted for this party (e.g. voter y and party B in 
Figure 1), its value is 2 if a voter is switching away from a party (e.g. voter x and party B in 
Figure 1) and its value is 3 if a voter switches towards a party (e.g. voter x and party C in 
Figure 1). 
 
For information on the party previously voted for, we make use of a recall question of 
previous voting behaviour.
2
 Such a question was included in Modules 2 and 3 of the CSES 
project.  Relying on information obtained from recall questions to study volatility, we have to 
acknowledge that these are imperfect measures. Previous research has indicated that the use 
of recall questions leads to an underestimation of volatility, due to memory problems or 
because voters adjust their recalled vote to be in line with their current preference (Van Der 
Eijk & Niemöller, 1983; Waldahl & Aardal, 2000). Furthermore, the extent to which 
                                                        
2
 By relying on scientific election reports of each of the elections covered, we can take into account splits and 
mergers of parties when constructing this measure of party switching. See Dassonneville & Dejaeghere (2014) 
for more details. 
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respondents correctly recall their previous vote is most likely to be correlated to variables that 
are usually linked to party switching. As Converse (1962: 580) has indicated, “The same 
theory which predicts that the less involved are more susceptible to change suggests that the 
less involved will also give less accurate accounts of past political behaviour”. The lack of 
comparative panel studies on election behaviour, however, renders the use of cross-sectional 
data and recalled vote choices the only option for investigating our research question. In the 
estimation sample, 29.7% of respondents report to have switched parties at the current 
election (standard deviation of 0.46). 
 
In order to assess the impact of ideological shifts in party positions on respondents’ likelihood 
of switching parties, we compute whether and to what extent the ideological distance between 
a respondent’s position and a party’s ideological position at the current election has changed 
since the previous election. We thus construct a delta-measure (Δ) of change in ideological 
positions by subtracting the absolute distance between a voter and a party at time t from the 
absolute distance between the voter and the party at time t-1. Consequently, a negative Δ 
distance value implies that the party is shifting towards the voter’s position, while a positive Δ 
distance value implies that a party is shifting away from her. The question used in the CSES 
dataset to locate respondents’ left-right position is: “In politics people sometimes talk of left 
and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 
10 means the right?”. Respondents were also asked to locate each party on the same left-right 
scale. For each party, we compute the median position has perceived by all respondents.
3
 By 
using perceived positions, we take into account previous research pointing out that voters do 
not react to manifestos but do react to perceived ideological positions (Adams et al., 2014). 
Note that for computing parties’ shifts from one election to another we only use elections that 
were consecutive. To increase the number of consecutive elections we use data from Module 
1 of the CSES dataset and we complement this with national election studies that ask 
respondents to locate each party on a left-right scale.
4
  
 
                                                        
3
 Note that we follow Warwick’s procedure (2011) and transform the parties’ left-right position into a continuous 
variable. For each respondent, we add a random number following a uniform distribution with mean zero 
varying from -0.5 to 0.5. For instance, respondents who located a party at 4 on the left-right scale are now 
distributed uniformly over the 3.5-4.5 interval. The main implication is that instead of having party positions for 
each country located at position 4, 5 or 6 as is usually the case, we get party positions for each country that are 
more reflective of a real continuous distribution. 
4
 These are Australia (2001, Australian Election Studies), Denmark (2005, Danish Election Projects – Dansk 
Data Arkiv), Great Britain (2001, British Election Study), Netherlands (2003, Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Study) and New Zealand (1999, and 2005 New Zealand Election Studies). 
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Our expectation is that Δ distance will have a positive impact on a respondent’s likelihood 
moving away from a party (H1a). This would indicate that if the respondent’s party has 
moved away ideologically from the respondent, she is more likely to desert that party. 
Furthermore, we expect Δ distance to have a negative impact on a respondent’s likelihood to 
move towards a party (H1b). That observation would indicate that as a party shifts away from 
a voter, this voter is less likely to switch to this party. Note that there is no recall question on 
respondents’ ideological position at the previous election. A major limitation of the cross-
sectional nature of our data is consequently that we cannot take into account possible shifts 
from the part of voters themselves. As a result, we can only shed light on one side of the story 
of ideological shifts affecting voting behaviour. 
 
We expect the impact of Δ distance on the likelihood of switching to be conditioned by 
individual and party-level characteristics. To measure a respondent’s level of political 
sophistication, different operationalizations have been suggested in the literature. A number 
of scholars have pointed out that political knowledge is probably the best single indicator 
measuring political sophistication (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Lachat, 2007). We hence 
use the three political knowledge questions provided in the CSES data set and combine them. 
For each respondent, we sum the number of correct answers and divided this by the average 
number of correct answers in the respondent’s country-election sample. This procedure 
accounts for the cross-national variation in level of respondents’ political knowledge (Singh 
and Thornton 2013). We expect the interaction between sophistication and Δ distance to have 
a positive impact on the likelihood to switch away from a party and a negative impact on the 
probability to switch towards a party. Higher levels of sophistication should hence strengthen 
the main effects of Δ distance on switching away from and towards a party.  
 
Finally, the CSES dataset provides the number of cabinet portfolios hold by each party before 
and after elections. Based on this information, we compute a dummy variable coded one if a 
party was in government before the election. We also create a variable for whether this party 
was part of a single-party or a coalition government. We expect the interaction between 
government and Δ distance to have a positive impact on switching away from a party, and a 
negative impact on switching towards a party. This would be indicating that the impact of 
parties’ ideological shifts on respondents’ likelihood of switching is greater if the party was in 
government (H3a). We also expect the interaction between single-party government and Δ 
distance to be positive and greater than the interaction between coalition government and Δ 
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distance for moving away from a party and negatively so for moving towards a party.  This 
would be indication that the impact of parties’ ideological shifts is greater for voters who 
supported a party in a single-party government than a party in a coalition government (H3b). 
 
Testing these individual-level hypotheses we obviously control for a number of factors that 
can be thought to lead to volatility. Aside from socio-demographic variables (age, sex, 
education), the models also include a number of variables that have regularly been linked to 
volatility. First, we control for a respondent’s level of political sophistication. A number of 
different expectations have been formulated in the literature but recent studies empirically 
point out to a curvilinear link, with the highest probability of switching among the middle 
sophisticated (Dassonneville & Dejaeghere, 2014; Kuhn, 2009; Lachat, 2007). Second, we 
control for respondents’ levels of satisfaction with democracy and political efficacy, as 
previous research has pointed out that volatility is an expression of political disaffection 
(Dassonneville, 2012; Zelle, 1995). Obviously, we also control for the impact of partisanship 
on volatility, as voters who identify with a particular party are also less likely to switch parties 
from one election to another. Additionally, given that partisanship can act as a lens for 
processing political information (Bartels, 2002; Zaller, 1992), controlling for partisanship can 
be considered essential when investigating the impact of parties’ ideological shifts on voters’ 
behaviour. Finally, the models also account for the ideological distance between each party 
and a voter given that greater distance should reduce the likelihood of switching parties.  [see 
Appendix on how all of these variables are measured] 
 
 4.2. METHOD 
The data have a hierarchical structure, with respondent-party dyads nested in respondents, 
respondents nested in elections and these elections nested in countries. A number of 
modelling approaches can be taken to take this nested structure into account.  Our variables of 
interest are all situated at the party-respondent or individual-level, we hence control for the 
election-level by means of the inclusion of election-specific dummies. Further, the nesting of 
dyads within individuals is accounted for by the presentations of cluster-robust standard 
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errors.
5
 Since the dependant variable is categorical we use multinomial logistic regressions to 
assess the impact of the independent variables on the likelihood of switching parties (or not).  
 
The results of a multinomial logistic regression could be difficult to interpret since the impact 
of the regression coefficients are relative to the category of reference of the dependent 
variable. A better way to interpret the impact of the different variables is thus to examine 
directly their marginal effects on each category of the dependent variable. In the results 
section, we therefore present the marginal effects in percentage points associated with our 
variables of interest. The full results of the multinomial logistic regressions are displayed in 
appendix. 
 
5. RESULTS 
In Table 1, we test the impact of our main hypotheses – that a party shifting away from a 
voter increases her likelihood of switching away from this party (H1a) and decreases her 
likelihood of switching towards this party (H1b). In Table 1, we present the marginal effects 
of ∆ distance on a voter’s likelihood of realizing each of the four outcome categories of the 
dependent variable (stable vote, stable non-vote, switching away, and switching towards). The 
results provide some evidence supporting our rationales. Even if ∆ distance does not have a 
positive impact on the likelihood of switching away as we expected (H1a) – the impact is 
negative and not statistically significant – the impact of ∆ distance on the other outcomes are 
all in the expected directions. Consistent with H1b, the marginal effect of ∆ distance on the 
likelihood of switching towards a party is negative and statistically significant at the 0.001 
level. This indicates that as a party is moving away from a voter one unit on the left-right 
scale, the likelihood that a voter will switch towards this party decreases by 1.20 percentage 
points. Moreover, the impact of ∆ distance on the likelihood of a stable vote and a stable non-
vote as well are in expected directions. The negative marginal effect of ∆ distance on stable 
vote indicates that a voter is less likely to remain voting a party when the latter is moving 
away from the voter’s ideological position. On the other hand, the positive marginal effect of 
∆ distance on stable non-vote indicates that as the other parties (the ones a voter did not vote 
for at the last election) move away from the voter, the latter is more likely to continue not 
                                                        
5
 We are obviously aware of the fact that robust-standard errors do not ‘fix’ problems that come with a nested 
structure (King & Roberts, 2012). The size of the dataset, however (with an N of over 120,000 at the dyad level), 
combined with the three-level structure and the multinomial logit specification, complicate the estimation of 
random intercept and random slopes specification of the current models. It remains to be seen whether our 
results are robust to such specifications in future versions of this paper. 
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voting for them at the current election. Overall, it seems therefore, as if volatility is indeed – 
partly – driven by the fact that voters respond to parties, since the probability that a voter 
switches parties (or not) is a function to whether parties move away from her in between 
elections.  
 
Table 1: Marginal Effects of ∆ Distance and Distancet-1 on the Likelihood of Switching 
Parties (or not) 
 
Stable vote Stable non-vote Switching away Switching towards 
∆ distance -2.32 (0.19)*** 3.73 (0.24)*** -0.22 (0.14) -1.20 (0.14)*** 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 20,679 
individual-clusters. The marginal effects are percentage points. See Table A in appendix for the full results of the 
multinomial logistic regression. 
 
In a next step, we examine whether the impact of ∆ distance is conditioned by individual and 
party-level factors. First, in order to test the conditioning impact of political sophistication, 
political sophistication is interacted with ∆ distance in Table 2. Contrary with our expectation 
(H2), the marginal effect of the interaction is not statistically different from 0 for the 
likelihood of switching away or towards a party. These results indicate that the more 
sophisticated are not more likely to switch parties when the parties are moving towards or 
away from them, which would imply that parties’ ideological shifts are equally visible for all 
voters. However, the impact of ∆ distance is slightly larger as sophistication increases with 
regard to casting a stable vote and a stable non-vote. This is clear from the negative and 
positive marginal effects of the interaction effects under stable vote and stable non-vote, 
respectively – both effects are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Overall, it seems that 
sophistication conditions the impact of ∆ distance but only on the likelihood of voting again 
for the same party (stable vote) or not voting for the same parties (stable non-vote). 
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Table 2: The Conditional Impact of Sophistication on the Likelihood of Switching 
Parties (or not) 
 
Stable vote Stable non-vote Switching away Switching 
towards 
Sophistication -0.03 (0.08) 0.51 (0.09)*** -0.26 (0.07)*** -0.23 (0.07)*** 
∆ distance -1.70 (0.34)*** 3.05 (0.42)*** -0.23 (0.25) -1.12 (0.24)*** 
Sophistication* 
∆ distance -0.55 (0.25)* 0.62 (0.31)* 0.01 (0.19) -0.08 (0.17) 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 20,679 
individual-clusters. The marginal effects are percentage points. See Table B in appendix for the full results of the 
multinomial logistic regression. 
 
In Table 3, we examine whether the status of a party as being in government or in opposition 
conditions the impact of ∆ distance. The results do not offer support for our hypothesis (H3a). 
First, in line with the results presented in Table 1 and 2, voters are not more likely to switch 
away from a party if the party moves away from the voter, even if that party was in 
government. However, it does seems that voters are more likely to switch parties when they 
voted for a party in government at the last election – everything else being equal. Second, it 
appears that shifts of parties in government do not trigger switching towards these parties. 
This becomes clear when summing the marginal effects of ∆ distance (-1.70) and 
government*∆ distance (1.55) which equals -0.15 and is not statistically significant. However, 
shifts from the part of parties in government are influential for the likelihood of a stable vote 
given the interaction of government and ∆ distance that is negative and statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level.  
 
Table 3: The Conditional Impact of Government Participation on the Likelihood of 
Switching Parties (or not) 
 
Stable vote Stable non-vote Switching away Switching 
towards 
Government 5.68 (0.16)*** -7.62 (0.21)*** 2.18 (0.12)*** -0.23 (0.12) 
∆ distance -2.36 (0.25)*** 4.33 (0.31)*** -0.26 (0.20) -1.70 (0.17)*** 
Government*  
∆ distance -1.01 (0.38)** -0.13 (0.48) -0.40 (0.29) 1.55 (0.30)*** 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 20,679 
individual-clusters. The marginal effects are percentage points. See Table C in appendix for the full results of the 
multinomial logistic regression. 
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In Table 4, we add even more detail and interact the status of a party as being in a single-party 
government with ∆ distance and being part of a coalition government with ∆ distance (the 
reference category being in opposition). The results are consistent with the general 
government results in Table 3. With respect to the likelihood of switching away (H3b) the 
impact of ∆ distance is not different for parties that are in a single-party government or in a 
coalition government compared to what holds for parties in opposition – both effects are not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The results related to the likelihood of switching 
towards a party, by contrast, do provide some support for our hypothesis. The interaction 
effect of single-party government with ∆ distance is negative and not statistically significant 
while the interaction effect of coalition government with ∆ distance is positive and 
statistically significant. This indicates that a voter is not more likely to switch towards a party 
in a coalition government when the latter moves towards her but that she is more likely to do 
so when the party is part of a single-party government or when the party is in opposition. In 
addition, the interaction effects of ∆ distance with single-party and coalition are in the 
expected directions for stable vote as well, indicating that the impact of parties’ shifts on 
stable vote is stronger under single-party governments. These results provide some support 
for the rationale that it is more difficult for voters to attribute political responsibility to parties 
within coalition governments than what holds for single-party governments. 
 
Table 4: The Conditional Impact of Single-Party and Coalition Governments on the 
Likelihood of Switching Parties (or not) 
 
Stable vote Stable non-vote Switching away Switching towards 
Single-
party  9.06 (0.42)*** -11.75 (0.60)*** 4.00 (0.33)*** -1.31 (0.38)** 
Coalition 4.96 (0.18)*** -6.80 (0.22)*** 1.90 (0.13)*** -0.05 (0.13) 
∆ distance -2.45 (0.25)*** 4.42 (0.30)*** -0.30 (0.19) -1.68 (0.17)*** 
Single-
party 
*∆ distance -1.84 (0.93)* 2.63 (1.63) 0.66 (1.04) -1.46 (1.54) 
Coalition*  
∆ distance -1.14 (0.39)** -0.08 (0.49) -0.42 (0.29) 1.64 (0.30)*** 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 20,679 
individual-clusters. See Table D in appendix for the full results of the multinomial logistic regression. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
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The aim of this paper was to disentangle more precisely the mechanisms that cause voters to 
switch parties from one election to another. By doing so, we move research focusing on the 
link between political sophistication and volatility further. Furthermore, by linking parties’ 
ideological shifts to individual-level volatility, we also add to the literature on voter-party 
responsiveness. This line of research is still mostly limited to the impact of parties’ shifts on 
voters’ perceptions instead of the behavioural consequences thereof.   
 
The results of our analyses provide some support for our hypotheses. Most importantly, 
parties’ ideological shifts fosters both switching and stability of voting behaviour. However, it 
seems that switching is not only the consequence of a single party moving away from voters 
in between elections. Switching seems rather the result of the interplay between voters and 
multiple parties. A party that is drifting away from voters combined to the presence of another 
party that moves towards the voters seem particularly important for explaining whether voters 
switch parties. This result goes counter the conception of ‘floating voters’ who switch 
randomly. Instead, voters do respond to how parties are perceived to move ideologically, 
which indicates that switching parties is to a certain extent a tool for voters to hold parties 
accountable.  
 
Obviously, this study suffers from a number of limitations. First, our focus on parties’ shifts 
necessitates the reliance on a dataset that covers a substantial number of parties. We hence 
chose to use the data from a large comparative dataset, the CSES. The cross-sectional nature 
of the election studies in this dataset, however, implies that we have to rely on a recall 
question for investigating volatility. We hence have to acknowledge that we most likely 
underestimate the true amount of volatility. In the absence of large comparative datasets of 
election studies of a panel format, however, the use of recall data is the only way out 
(Dassonneville & Dejaeghere, 2014). 
 
Second, while we do measure shifts in parties’ ideological positions, we cannot take into 
account whether voters as well have moved ideologically. It is thus possible that we over-
estimate the impact of distance in the empirical models since this variable may also capture 
the fact that voters have moved away from their party. Despite these limitations, we think our 
results are insightful and add to our knowledge in the fields of volatility as well as 
responsiveness. More research, however, is needed on the nature of the mechanism and more 
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studies should validate whether our results hold if panel-data could be used for investigating 
our research questions. 
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7.  APPENDIX 
 
In this section, we detail the computation of the control variables. Age is computed as the age 
of a respondent and ranges between 18 and 100. Men is a dummy variable coded one for men 
and zero for women. Education is an ordinal variable that ranges from 1 to 8. Party 
identification is an ordinal variable coded 0 for non-partisans, 1 for respondents who feel not 
very close to their party, 2 for those who feel somewhat close, and 3 for those who feel very 
close to their party. Democratic satisfaction is an ordinal variable coded 0 for respondents 
who are not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, 1 for those who 
are not very satisfied, 2 for those who are fairly satisfied, and 3 for those who are very 
satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Political efficacy is the average of 
two questions: who is in power can make a difference and who people vote for makes a 
difference. This variable ranges from one to five. The question used in the CSES dataset to 
locate respondents’ left-right position is: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. 
Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means 
the right?”.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A : The Impact of ∆ Distance on the Likelihood of Switching Parties (or not)  
 Stable non-vote vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
Switching away vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
Switching towards vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
∆ distance  0.383 (0.027)*** 0.245 (0.042)*** -0.027 (0.043) 
Distance t-1  0.552 (0.008)*** 0.165 (0.013)*** 0.083 (0.013)*** 
Age  -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.012 (0.001)*** -0.013 (0.001)*** 
Men  0.017 (0.013) -0.025 (0.033) -0.061 (0.034) 
Education  0.025 (0.004)*** 0.040 (0.011)*** 0.041 (0.011)*** 
Partisan  -2.513 (0.038)*** -1.105 (0.031)*** -0.670 (0.022)*** 
Democratic satisfaction 0.033 (0.010)** -0.097 (0.026)*** -0.072 (0.027)** 
Political efficacy  0.020 (0.007)** -0.047 (0.018)** -0.064 (0.018)*** 
Political sophistication 0.035 (0.026) 0.044 (0.065) 0.067 (0.066) 
Political sophistication
2
 -0.007 (0.010) -0.040 (0.025) -0.049 (0.025) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.208      
AIC  13,8842.266      
N respondent-party dyads 126,296      
N respondents  20,679      
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 20,679 individual-clusters. Election-specific fixed effects included (not 
shown). 
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Table B : The Conditional Impact of Sophistication on the Likelihood of Switching Parties (or not)  
 
Stable non-vote vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
Switching away vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
Switching towards vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
∆ distance 0.291 (0.048)*** 0.166 (0.075)* -0.053 (0.024)* 
Sophistication*∆ distance 0.083 (0.035)* 0.071 (0.056) 0.083 (0.013)*** 
Sophistication 0.017 (0.010) -0.054 (0.024)* -0.013 (0.001)*** 
Distance t-1 0.552 (0.008)*** 0.165 (0.013)*** -0.060 (0.034) 
Age -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.012 (0.001)*** 0.041 (0.011)*** 
Men 0.017 (0.013) -0.024 (0.033) -0.671 (0.022)*** 
Education 0.026 (0.004)*** 0.041 (0.010)*** -0.070 (0.027)** 
Partisan -2.513 (0.038)*** -1.106 (0.031)*** -0.063 (0.018)*** 
Democratic satisfaction 0.033 (0.010)** -0.096 (0.026)*** -0.053 (0.024)* 
Political efficacy 0.020 (0.007)** -0.047 (0.018)** 0.083 (0.013)*** 
Pseudo R
2
 0.208      
AIC 13,8843.527      
N respondent-party dyads 126,296      
N respondents  20,679      
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 20,679 individual-clusters. Election-specific fixed effects included (not 
shown). 
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Table C : The Conditional Impact of Government Participation on the Likelihood of Switching Parties (or not)  
 
Stable non-vote vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
Switching away vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
Switching towards vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
∆ distance  0.414 (0.036)*** 0.248 (0.058)*** -0.137 (0.054)* 
Government*∆ distance 0.110 (0.055)* 0.017 (0.086) 0.492 (0.091)*** 
Government -0.892 (0.024)*** -0.192 (0.035)*** -0.720 (0.037)*** 
Distance t-1  0.553 (0.009)*** 0.166 (0.013)*** 0.080 (0.013)*** 
Age  -0.001 (0.000)** -0.012 (0.001)*** -0.012 (0.001)*** 
Men  0.020 (0.013) -0.024 (0.033) -0.056 (0.034) 
Education  0.025 (0.004)*** 0.040 (0.011)*** 0.040 (0.011)*** 
Partisan  -2.505 (0.038)*** -1.110 (0.031)*** -0.676 (0.022)*** 
Democratic satisfaction 0.054 (0.010)*** -0.081 (0.026)** -0.044 (0.027) 
Political efficacy  0.019 (0.007)** -0.048 (0.018)** -0.063 (0.018)*** 
Political sophistication 0.036 (0.027) 0.045 (0.065) 0.071 (0.066) 
Political sophistication
2
 -0.008 (0.010) -0.040 (0.025) -0.051 (0.025)* 
Pseudo R
2
 0.219      
AIC  136,983.947      
N respondent-party dyads 126,296      
N respondents  20,679      
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 20,679 individual-clusters. Election-specific fixed effects included (not 
shown). 
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Table D : The Conditional Impact of Single-Party and Coalition Governments on the Likelihood of Switching Parties (or not)  
 
Stable non-vote vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
Switching away vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
Switching towards vs 
Stable vote (reference) 
∆ distance  0.428 (0.036)*** 0.250 (0.058)*** -0.120 (0.053)* 
Single-party government*∆ distance 0.305 (0.131)* 0.394 (0.276) -0.140 (0.416) 
Coalition government*∆ distance 0.127 (0.057)* 0.027 (0.088) 0.529 (0.092)*** 
Single-party government -1.411 (0.064)*** -0.176 (0.089)* -1.382 (0.107)*** 
Coalition government -0.786 (0.026)*** -0.170 (0.038)*** -0.595 (0.040)*** 
Distance t-1  0.554 (0.009)*** 0.167 (0.013)*** 0.081 (0.013)*** 
Age  -0.001 (0.000)** -0.012 (0.001)*** -0.013 (0.001)*** 
Men  0.018 (0.013) -0.024 (0.033) -0.058 (0.034) 
Education  0.025 (0.004)*** 0.040 (0.011)*** 0.039 (0.011)*** 
Partisan  -2.498 (0.038)*** -1.109 (0.031)*** -0.668 (0.022)*** 
Democratic satisfaction 0.053 (0.010)*** -0.081 (0.026)** -0.045 (0.027) 
Political efficacy  0.019 (0.007)** -0.048 (0.018)** -0.063 (0.018)*** 
Political sophistication 0.036 (0.027) 0.045 (0.065) 0.071 (0.066) 
Political sophistication
2
 -0.007 (0.010) -0.040 (0.025) -0.051 (0.025)* 
Pseudo R
2
 0.220      
AIC  136,838.856      
N individuals  126,296      
N elections  20,679      
Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses are robust for 20,679 individual-clusters. Election-specific fixed effects included (not 
shown). 
 
